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Direct Regulation of Hedge Funds: An Analysis of 
Hedge Fund Regulation After the Implementation of 
Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act 
 
By: Jacob Johnson* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Title IV of Dodd-Frank was enacted in response to the global financial 
crisis of 2008 and the political pressure to be proactive and to prevent 
another financial crisis that followed.1  However, this note argues that this 
increase in hedge fund regulation is, in part, unnecessary.  Overall, this 
note will focus on the changes made to the Investment Advisers Act of 
1940 (“Advisers Act”) by the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act, H.R. 4173 2010 (“Dodd-Frank”) 
and the benefits of an indirect regulatory strategy. 
 
II. HEDGE FUND OVERVIEW 
 
A hedge fund is a private investment pool that is managed by a 
professional investment firm (also referred to as a “hedge fund manager” 
or “investment advisor”).2  The ultimate goal of a hedge fund is to provide 
returns to investors that do not necessarily mirror the returns of traditional 
stock or bond markets.  Hedge funds differ from mutual funds because 
hedge funds do not seek “relative” returns, meaning hedge funds do not 
measure their success by comparison to a benchmark such as the S&P 500 
stock index.3  Rather, hedge funds seek “absolute returns,” which means 
they aim to make positive returns regardless of how a certain benchmark 
is performing by employing a variety of sophisticated trading strategies in 
                                                        
* Jacob Johnson is a Class of 2018 Juris Doctor Candidate at DePaul University 
College of Law and Research Staff Member of the DePaul Business and Commercial 
Law Journal. He earned a B.A. in Political Science and minor in Business from the 
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign in 2015. He would like to thank his 
parents, John and Rebecca Johnson, for their constant support.  
1 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection (Dodd-Frank Act), Pub. 
L. No. 111-203, §§ 401-416, 124 Stat. 1376, 1571 (2010) (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C. § 80b-3, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2). 
2 Hedge Fund, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/h/hedgefund.asp 
(last visited Mar. 25, 2018). 
3 Hedge Funds and Dodd-Frank Reform, MANAGED FUNDS ASS’N., 
https://www.managedfunds.org/hedge- 
fund-investors/hedge-fund-advisor/. (Feb. 28, 2018).  
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securities, currencies and derivatives, amongst others.4  Additionally, 
hedge funds are limited to high net worth investors and institutional 
investors.  Therefore, the idea is that the increased regulation of hedge 
funds is not completely necessary because the sophisticated investors (i.e., 
institutional investors such as insurance companies, pension funds, banks, 
and other investment funds) do not need the same level of protection as an 
ordinary retail investor who may not understand the risks associated with 
hedge funds. 
Throughout the course of this comment the following topics will be 
discussed in order to explain why the changes imposed by Title IV are 
unnecessary: (1) risks associated with hedge funds; (2) the Investment 
Advisers Act of 1940; (3) the failure of Long Term Capital Management 
and the implications of this failure; (4) an overview of the changes made 
after Title IV was enacted; (5) the impact of the Private Fund Investment 
Advisors Registration Act of 2010 (“PFIARA”) on examinations of 
registered investment advisers; (6) the problems with the current U.S. 
regulatory scheme; and (7) a possible solution of introducing indirect 
regulation. 
Finally, this note argues that the indirect regulation of hedge funds is 
superior to the direct regulation of hedge funds exacerbated by Title IV of 
the Dodd-Frank Act.  Mainly, direct regulation of hedge funds has proven 
to be failure in terms of curbing systemic risk, as can be seen by Long 
Term Capital Management.  The indirect regulation of hedge funds places 
the regulatory focus on the counterparties of hedge funds in order to 
achieve the primary goal of regulating hedge funds.  Indirect regulation of 
hedge funds will limit systemic risk because counterparties of hedge funds 
will be more careful and informed before entering into transactions with 
hedge funds. 
 
III. RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH HEDGE FUNDS 
 
One of the key risks associated with hedge funds are their speculative 
trading techniques, which use leverage (borrowed capital or equity for an 
investment) hoping that the profits made will be greater than the interest 
paid on the borrowed capital.  In general, the use of leverage by a hedge 
fund is when the hedge fund uses both the investors’ capital and the 
borrowed capital to make investments, which will either greatly increase 
                                                        
4 Wulf Kaal & Dale Oesterle, The History of Hedge Fund Regulation in the United 
States, THE CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Feb. 29, 2016), 
http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2016/02/29/the-history-of-hedge-fund-
regulation-in-the-united-states/. 
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the potential gain, or greatly increase the potential loss from an 
investment.5  Also, unlike mutual funds, hedge funds are allowed to take 
short positions or sell short.  For example, this requires that the hedge fund 
borrow stock, and if the stock price declines before the hedge funds needs 
to give back the borrowed stock, the hedge fund makes a profit.6  However, 
if the stock price increases the hedge fund must still replace the stock it 
borrowed and the losses are theoretically unlimited putting the investors at 
risk.  This is a basic example of a speculative trading technique used by 
hedge funds cause a lot of concern regarding the hedge fund industry.     
Further, one of the chief concerns regarding hedge funds is that they are 
not sufficiently transparent.7  This concern stems from the fact that prior 
to the passage of Title IV of Dodd-Frank, many hedge funds qualified to 
be exempted from complying with the Advisers Act and therefore did not 
have to disclose their investment strategies or their books and records 
containing certain positions that some may be view as too risky.8  The anti-
regulation view held by many hedge funds is that without the ability to 
keep their trading strategies confidential, hedge funds would not be able to 
generate the massive returns that keep most them business.9  Also, there 
are concerns over the level of risk-taking by hedge funds.10  Hedge funds 
usually borrow from banks and when a hedge fund’s strategy fails the 
losses are massive not only to the investors of a hedge fund but also for the 
banks and other lenders.11  In 2004, as a result of the growth of the hedge 
fund industry and the risks involved, the SEC determined that hedge fund 
managers should register under the Advisers Act.12  To ensure hedge fund 
managers registered their funds, the SEC adopted a rule requiring 
investment advisers of hedge funds to “look-through” the fund and counts 
as clients the fund’s investors for purposes of the fifteen-client threshold.13  
                                                        
5 Leverage, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/l/leverage.asp (last 
visited Mar. 25, 2018). 
6 Todd Zaun, Goldstein v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 1 J. BUS. 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 111, 130 (2007), 
http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/jbel/vol1/iss1/6. 
7 Kaal & Oesterle, supra note 4. 
8 Id.  
9 Zaun, supra, 111.  
10  Id at 113. 
11 Kaal & Oesterle, supra note 4.  
12 William Sjostrom, Jr , Brief History of Hedge Fund Adviser Registration And its 
Consequences for Private Equity and Venture Capital Advisers, 1 HARV. L. REV., 
39, 40 (Feb. 1, 2011) http://www.hblr.org/2011/02/a-brief-history-of-hedge-fund-
adviser-registration-and-its-consequences-for-private-equity-and-venture-capital-
advisers/.  
13 Id.  
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This development was significant because prior to this “look-through” 
rule, only hedge funds managed by the advisor counted as “clients.”  The 
specifics of the “look-through” rule commonly referred to as the “hedge 
fund rule” will be discussed in the section of this note titled, “Failure of 
Long Term Capital Management and its Effect on Policy,” which explains 
the event that initially led the SEC to implement the hedge fund rule. 
 
A. General Reasons Why These Risks Should Not be Left Unregulated 
Altogether 
 
Some form of regulation is necessary to protect investors in the hedge 
fund sector.  Although hedge fund investors are typically sophisticated and 
wealthy, they are still in need of protection. Even if an investor has 
sufficient technical skills to properly assess and value the behavior of their 
hedge fund manager it is still a nearly impossible task considering that no 
hedge fund manager discloses the necessary information to investors, 
which would allow them to monitor the fund’s activity.14  There are also 
investment companies, referred to as “funds of hedge funds,” that focus on 
investing in other hedge funds.15  Retail investors are able to buy shares of 
these funds of hedge funds, which effectively allows retail investors to 
indirectly invest in hedge funds.16  In this regard, some form of regulation 
of hedge funds would indirectly benefit the retail investors who otherwise 
would not be able to monitor and assess their investments.  
 
IV. THE INVESTMENT ADVISERS ACT OF 1940 
 
Under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (“Advisers Act”) many 
hedge fund advisers did not have to register their funds with the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) because of the private adviser 
exemption.17  This exemption applied to an investment adviser who: (1) 
had fewer than fifteen clients during the previous twelve months (small 
adviser exemption), (2) did not publicly hold itself out as an investment 
adviser, and (3) did not advise registered investment companies.18  An 
“investment adviser” as defined by section 202(a)(11) of the Advisers Act 
                                                        
14 Marco Bodellini, From Systemic Risk to Financial Scandals: The Shortcomings of 
U.S. Hedge Funds Regulation, 11 BROOK. J. CORP. & COM. L. 417, 447 (2017). 
15 Matthew Lewis, A Transatlantic Dilemma: A Comparative Review of America 
and British Hedge Fund Regulation, 22 Emory Int’l L. Rev. 347, 358 (2008). 
16 Bodellini, supra note 14, at 448. 
17 Sjostrom, supra note 12, at 39..  
18 Id. Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (54 Stat. 847, 15 U.S.C. 80b-1 - 80b-2) 
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defines an investment advisor as any person or firm that: (1) for 
compensation; (2) is engaged in the business of; (3) providing advice to 
others or issuing reports or analyses regarding securities.19  The phrase “for 
compensation” refers to the adviser receiving some sort of fee or 
commission for his or her services.20  A person “engaged in the business” 
simply means that the person is providing some sort of investment advice 
regarding securities such as stocks, bonds, other funds, etc.21   
Under the Advisers Act and prior to the passage of Title IV of Dodd-
Frank, investment advisers, such as hedge fund managers, were able to 
qualify for the private adviser exemption even though their fund had more 
than fifteen investors because they only had to count as clients the funds 
they advised and not the individual investors in the fund. 22  In other words, 
hedge fund managers only counted entire hedge funds as clients as opposed 
to counting the individuals who have invested money within the hedge 
funds.  This often allowed investment advisers to avoid registering with 
the SEC, which in turn allowed them to avoid the various provisions of the 
Advisers Act.23  Investment advisers were therefore able to avoid 
provisions of the Advisers Act such as the requirement to disclose certain 
information to clients, maintain business records, allow the SEC to 
examine these books and records,24 and make certain periodic filings with 
the SEC. 
 
V. FAILURE OF LONG TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT AND ITS EFFECT 
ON POLICY 
 
One of the reasons the SEC wanted to increase hedge fund regulation 
was because of the collapse of the hedge fund, Long Term Capital 
Management, L.P. (“LTCM”) in 1998.25  LTCM had lost $4.4 billion of its 
$4.7 billion in capital, which not only hurt the investors of the fund, but 
exposed America’s largest investment banks to over $1 trillion in default 
risks due to excessive leverage and risky trading strategies.26  LCTM used 
                                                        
19  15 U.S.C.S. § 80b-2(a)(11) 
20 SEC v. Fife, 311 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2002).  
21 Id. at 3.  
22 Sjostrom, supra note 12, at 39.  
23 Id. 
24 Id.  
25 Todd Zaun, Goldstein v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 1 PEPPERDINE J. 
BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 110, 118 (Nov. 11, 2007).. 
26 Stephanie Yang, The Epic Story of How a ‘Genius’ Hedge Fund Almost Caused a 
Global Financial Meltdown, BUS. INSIDER (Jul. 10, 2014, 4:26 PM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/the-fall-of-long-term-capital-management-2014-
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massive amounts of leverage to pursue its investment goals.27  LTCM was 
known to be extremely secretive regarding its operations and the general 
partners withheld information about the strategies they were employing, 
which frustrated the numerous banks the hedge fund was working with 
because they were in the dark regarding how the capital they were lending 
was being put to use.28   
One of LTCM’s investment strategies was to hedge against a predictable 
range of volatility in foreign currencies and bonds.29  Eventually, Russia 
devalued its currency and defaulted on its bonds, a risk event that 
registered outside of LTCM’s statistical models had estimated.30  Later, the 
U.S. and European markets dropped significantly and investors across the 
U.S. and Europe frantically sought security in Treasury bonds, which then 
caused long-term interest rates to decrease by a full point.31  As a result, 
LTCM took devastating losses and had ended up losing 50% of the value 
of its capital invests.  Eventually, the investment banks and other creditors 
who had extended credit to LTCM realized that the fund might default, 
which would likely result in negatively affecting the global financial 
market.32  In order to avoid a global financial crisis, the Federal Reserve 
and about fifteen other prominent banks bailed out LTCM by investing 
$3.65 billion in exchange for 90% of the firm’s equity, which left existing 
shareholder with a mere 10% holding.33 
It was this example of the misuse of leverage by LTCM that led the SEC 
to create new registration requirements for hedge funds.  According to the 
Advisers Act, the SEC had the ability change or remove rules and 
requirements relating to the regulation of hedge funds.34  Therefore, on 
October 26, 2004, the SEC voted to modify the small advisers exemption 
portion of the Advisers Act.35  Under the new rule, “hedge fund managers 
                                                        
7?op=1/#riweather-set-up-his-own-hedge-fund-for-arbitrage-using-mathematical-
models-to-predict-prices-stocked-with-industry-veterans-and-respected-academics-
the-firm-launched-in-1994-with-125-billion-in-capital-2. 
27 Zaun, supra note 25 at 119.  
28 Yang, supra note 26.  
29 Kimberly Amadeo, What was the Long-Term Capital Management Hedge Fund 
Crisis?, THE BALANCE (Aug. 12, 2017), https://www.thebalance.com/long-term-
capital-crisis-3306240. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
32 Justin Asbury Dillmore, Leap Before You Look: The SEC’s Approach to Hedge 
Fund Regulation, 32 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 169, 171 (2006). 
33 Id. 
34 Zaun, supra note 25 at 116 
35 Justin Asbury Dillmore, Leap Before You Look: The SEC’s Approach to Hedge 
Fund Regulation, 32 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 169, 180 (2006). 
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that operate ‘private funds’36 will be required to count each shareholder, 
limited partner, member, other security holder or beneficiary of a private 
fund as a client.”37  Previously, the private adviser exemption allowed 
hedge fund managers to avoid registering with the SEC if they had fewer 
than fifteen funds as clients because individual investors did not count as 
“clients.”  Therefore, under this new requirement, all of the investors or 
shareholders of a private fund were each to be counted as separate clients 
of the hedge fund manager in counting towards the fifteen-client maximum 
stated within the small advisers exemption.38   
 
A. Hedge Fund Rule Determined to be Invalid 
 
The increased regulation proved very controversial because its 
definition of “client” was arguably at odds with the Congressional intent 
of the Advisers Act.39  The term “client” is commonly meant to describe 
an individual or entity that receives direct advice from an investment 
adviser rather than inactive investors who simply invest in the hedge fund 
hoping the fund realizes a profit.40  The important distinction is that most 
individual investors are simply contributing capital to hedge funds hoping 
to realize a profit and are not receiving investment advice.  On the contrary, 
the client, which is a hedge fund in this case, is an entity receiving 
investment advice from the hedge fund manager.  Individual investors are 
likely investing in the funds based on the fund managers’ expertise and on 
the reputation of the fund itself.  Moreover, the longstanding judicial 
interpretation the definition of “client” has been a person or entity that 
receives particularized advice.41  However, the SEC implemented the 
hedge fund rule regardless of previous judicial interpretation of the term 
                                                        
36 Rule 203(b)(3)-2(d)(1) states that a “private fund” is defined to mean a company: 
(1) that would be an investment company under Section 3(a) of the Investment 
Company Act of 1940; (2) that permits investors to redeem any portion of their 
ownership interest within two years of the purchase of their interests; and (3) that 
offers interests in the private fund based on the investment advisory skills, ability or 
expertise of the investment adviser.  Investment Company Act of 1940 (54 Stat. 789, 
15 U.S.C. 80b-3(b)(3)). 
37 SEC Commissioners Approve Proposed Rules to Require Certain Hedge Fund 
Managers to Register with the SEC, BULLET POINT, Oct. 27, 2004, 
http://www.tanhelp.com/newsworthy/index/html. 
38 Zaun, supra note 25 at 114. 
39 Id.  
40 Id.  
41 Id. See Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 191 (1985). 
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client because it felt that the widespread misuse of leverage and 
speculation were issues large enough to warrant a change.42 
Although the SEC was attempting to protect investors, its method for 
doing so was inconsistent with Congress’ intentions.43  In June 2006, a 
federal court of appeals held, in Goldstein v. SEC,44 that the look through 
rule exceeded the SEC’s authority and was invalid.  In Goldstein, Phillip 
Goldstein, a shareholder activist mainly participating in proxy battles, was 
the President of Kimball & Winthrop, Inc., the general partner of 
Opportunity Partners L.P.45 Goldstein operated a $40 million hedge fund 
from the basement of his home and he petitioned review of an order of the 
SEC regulating hedge funds under the Advisers Act via the look through 
provision and the hedge fund rule.46  Goldstein had two main theories that 
were meant to invalidate the hedge fund rule.47  First, he argued that the 
hedge fund rule violates Congressional intent by regulating private 
investment entities and advisers, which Congress has expressly exempted 
from regulation under the Advisers Act.48  Goldstein was arguing that the 
SEC overreached by attempting to rewrite the statute and create new law 
as opposed to simply modifying the rule.  Next, Goldstein focused on the 
definition of “client” as used in the Advisers Act and argues that its 
definition is clear as interpreted by Congress and therefore, requires no 
further interpretation by the SEC.49  Specifically, Goldstein is alleging that 
the hedge fund rule goes beyond its authority by changing the term “client” 
to include the individual investors, or shareholders, who have invested in 
the fund.50  Instead, Goldstein claims that Advisers Act intended the term 
“client” to refer to the partnership or fund-entity itself.  Even the SEC had 
previously interpreted “client” as referring to the hedge fund itself and so 
most hedge fund managers were exempt because almost all hedge fund 
managers managed fewer than fifteen funds.51   
The SEC did not address Goldstein’s arguments but rather emphasized 
that hedge funds needed to be regulated.52  The SEC focused on the growth 
of hedge funds and the potential impact funds can have on the financial 
                                                        
42 Id. 
43 Id. 
44 Goldstein v. S.E.C., 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
45 Id. at 874. 
46 Id. 
47 Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 874. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
50 Id.  
51 Id. at 876.  
52 Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 877. 
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markets on a larger scale and how this was putting individual investors at 
risk.53  Also, the SEC argued that hedge fund managers were actively 
involved in recent scandals (i.e., the LTCM failure) and retail investors 
were harmed by the far-reaching effects of the recklessness of these hedge 
funds.54  Finally, the SEC argued that registration decreases the likelihood 
of illegal activity and investor abuse because by requiring hedge fund 
managers to register with the SEC, the SEC is ensuring that managers with 
a history of committing fraud will be dealt with immediately.55   
The D.C. Circuit Court held that the hedge fund rule was arbitrary and 
capricious on its face and invalidated the SEC’s attempt to regulate hedge 
funds by requiring registration.56  The court sided with Goldstein by 
agreeing that even though the term “client” is not defined in the Advisers 
Act, the SEC has no right to imply its own definition simply by reasoning 
that it is ambiguous.57  The court explained its position by pointing to a 
1970 amendment which in the court’s opinion, represents congressional 
understanding that investment company entities (such as a hedge fund), 
not the shareholders (individual investors), were the hedge fund manager’s 
clients.58  Moreover, the court said that an individual investor in a private 
hedge fund may benefit or suffer directly from the hedge fund manager’s 
advice but the key difference is that the individual investor of a hedge fund 
does not receive that advice directly like that of a general retail59 
investment relationship.60   
In sum, the court’s decision was based on the idea that retail investors 
are not walking into the hedge fund’s office and receiving specific 
investment advice from an investment representative of the fund.61  For 
example, the hedge fund manager is not telling the investor how to spend 
his or her money because the investor made his or her own decision, 
without advice, to invest in the hedge fund.62  The court further stressed 
                                                        
53 Id. 
54 Id.  
55 Id. at 876.  
56 Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 882. 
57 Id. at 878. (The court explained that just because there is no definition in the 
statute explicitly defining “client,” that does not automatically render the meaning of 
“client” as being ambiguous). 
58 Id. 
59 A “retail investor” is a person who invests for their personal portfolio rather than 
for an organization or company. See Retail Investor, INVESTOPEDIA, 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/r/retailivnestor.asp, (Feb. 28, 2018).  
60 Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 879. 
61 Zaun, supra note 25 at 127. 
62 Id. at 129. 
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this point by citing to the Supreme Court in Lowe v. SEC, which held that 
those engaged in the investment advisory industry will “provide 
personalized advice to a client’s concerns,” marking a conception of 
fiduciary relationship.63  The Supreme Court in Lowe added that a direct, 
fiduciary relationship exists only between the adviser and the hedge fund, 
but not between the adviser and the investors in the fund.64  The key 
takeaway from the decision in Lowe is that “personalized advice to a 
client’s concerns” creates the fiduciary relationship and without an 
investment advisor providing personalized advice to an individual 
investor, the Adviser Act will not count the investor as a “client” of the 
fund.   
 
VI. OVERVIEW OF THE CHANGES MADE AFTER THE ENACTMENT OF 
TITLE IV OF THE DODD-FRANK ACT 
 
Included within Dodd-Frank is the Private Fund Investment Advisors 
Registration Act of 2010 (“PFIARA”), which changes the registration 
requirements of hedge fund advisers by requiring certain unregistered 
investment advisers to register with the SEC under the Advisers Act.65  
Most importantly, PFIARA removed the private adviser exemption 
contained in the Advisers Act, which exempted advisers of private funds 
from mandatory registration who: “(1) had less than 15 clients during the 
preceding 12 months, (2) do not hold themselves out to the public as 
investment advisers, and (3) do not advise registered funds subject to the 
Investment Company Act of 1940.”66  PFIARA also made changes 
impacting the reporting, disclosure, and record keeping requirements of 
investment advisers in order to provide the SEC with information 
necessary to evaluate systemic risk.67   
PFIARA removed the private adviser exemption from the Advisers Act, 
which means that hedge funds would likely have been better off had the 
SEC won in Goldstein because if the SEC had won, Congress might not 
have made changes to hedge fund registration requirements and left the 
                                                        
63 Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 880 (quoting Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 191 (1985)). 
64 Id.(quoting Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. at 208).  
65 Dodd-Frank Act, § 401. 
66 The Effect of Dodd-Frank on Hedge Fund Managers, INVESTMENT LAW GROUP 
(Aug. 18, 2010), http://www.investmentlawgroup.com/the-effect-of-dodd-frank-on-
hedge-fund-managers/. 
67 Dodd-Frank: Title IV - Regulation of Advisers to Hedge Funds and Others, 
CORNELL LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE (last visited Feb. 28, 2018) 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/dodd-frank_title_IV#.  
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hedge fund rule in place.68  Hedge funds would have been better off 
because Title IV of Dodd-Frank (PFIARA) effectively overruled the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Goldstein, which resulted in more stringent 
regulations regarding hedge fund manager registration than the original 
hedge fund rule was.69.  Section 408 of Dodd-Frank updates the Advisers 
Act and provides that “The Commission shall provide an exemption from 
the registration requirements under this section to any investment adviser 
of private funds, if each of such investment adviser acts solely as an adviser 
to private funds and has assets under management in the United States of 
less than $150,000,000.”70  Regarding private funds that do in fact satisfy 
the requirements of the new exemption, the Act provides that the SEC 
requires these investment advisers to maintain records and provide the 
SEC with annual or other reports, as the SEC determines necessary.71   
Under the adviser registration form, advisers to private funds (i.e., hedge 
fund managers) will have to provide basic organizational information 
about the fund, such as the size, ownership, and advisor’s services to the 
fund.72  In addition, the SEC strives to improve its regulatory program by 
requiring all registered advisers to provide information about their 
advisory business such as the types of clients they advise, their employees, 
and their advisory activities.73  Most importantly, the Act specifically 
requires the collection of information regarding the amount and types of 
assets under management, leverage, counterparty credit risk, trading and 
investment positions, valuation, side arrangements with investors, trading 
practices, and other information necessary for the protection of investors.74  
This information, in theory, will be used in order to prevent another 
LTCM-type failure resulting in risk of a global financial crisis.  However, 
                                                        
68 Sjostrom, supra note 12, at 40. See also Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 873 (The look-
through approach would not have deleted the private adviser exemption (small 
advisers exemption) altogether, but rather require that individual investors be 
considered as “clients” when determining the fifteen client rule). 
69 Kenneth Muller & Seth Chertok, The Impact of Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act on 
Investment Advisers, BLOOMBERG LAW REPORTS (2011) 
https://media2.mofo.com/documents/110124-title-iv-bloomberg.pdf. 
70 Dodd-Frank Act, § 408. 
71 Id. 
72 U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, SEC Adopts Dodd-Frank Act Amendments to 
Investment Advisers Act,  (June 22, 2011) 
https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-133.htm. 
73 Id. 
74 J.W. Verret, Revisiting Title IV: Why Mandatory SEC Registration for Hedge-
Fund Advisers Is Not Necessary, GEO. MASON U.: MERCATUS CTR 93-103 (Apr. 
2016), https://www.mercatus.org/publication/revisiting-title-iv-why-mandatory-sec-
registration-hedge-fund-advisers-not-necessary.  
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the problem with this is that the SEC does not have the resources or level 
of expertise necessary to organize, dissect, and understand this massive 
amount of information.  
 
A. Obligations of Investment Advisers Registered with the SEC 
 
This increased registration requirement now means that most hedge 
funds must register with the SEC, which is not the appropriate response 
because there are alternative regulatory approaches that would more 
effectively help solve any problems stemming from hedge funds.  The 
obligations that flow from the passage of the Act are mostly burdensome 
and ineffective.  Each of requirements associated with registration is 
discussed below. 
In order to comply with the Advisers Act, registered advisers need to 
submit Form ADV.  This form asks for basic information about the adviser, 
a history of the adviser, and requires an explanation of the hedge fund’s 
structure.75  The adviser must also implement a compliance program that 
contains written policies and procedures designed to prevent violation of 
the federal securities laws.76  The compliance program is expected to detect 
potential risks and prevent violation of federal securities.  Additionally, 
SEC filing requirements maintain that registered advisers must meet 
certain requirements in order to charge their clients a performance fee.77  
Registered advisers may not charge performance fees for the profit 
generated by the hedge fund unless the particular investor is a “qualified 
client.”78  A “qualified client” is one who has a net worth of $1.5 million 
dollars or places $750,000 under the advisor’s control.79  In theory, a 
qualified client is a sophisticated investor and understands the risks of 
investing money in a hedge fund. 
 
VII. DODD-FRANK ACT’S IMPACT ON REGISTERED INVESTMENT 
ADVISERS 
 
Section 914 of Title IX of the Dodd-Frank Act mandated that the SEC 
conduct a thorough study aimed at understanding the need for enhanced 
examination and enforcement resources for investment advisers (the 
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“Study”).80  Section III of the Study examines the impact of Dodd-Frank 
on the SEC’s examinations of registered investment advisers, which are 
performed by the Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations 
(“OCIE”).  This sub-section will describe the OCIE’s role and duties 
regarding the SEC’s investment adviser examination program.  The next 
section will discuss the number and frequency of examinations of 
registered investment advisers performed by OCIE staff between October 
1, 2004 and September 30, 2010.  The final section will discuss the impact 
of the Dodd-Frank Act on examinations of registered advisers as explained 
in the SEC’s “Study on Enhancing Investment Adviser Examinations.”81 
 
A. OCIE’s Role and Duties Regarding the SEC’s Investment Advisor 
Examination Program 
 
The SEC, through OCIE staff is charged with examining registered 
investment advisers’ books, records and activities with the goal of 
improving compliance, preventing fraud, monitoring risk, and informing 
regulatory policy.82  OCIE conducts examinations of high-risk investment 
advisers, examinations based on tips or complaints, and examinations 
referred to as “special purpose reviews,” which are risk-targeted sweeps 
covering a wide range of regulated entities and limited in scope on specific 
areas of concern within the financial services industry.83  These 
examinations of registered investment advisers focus on detecting 
violations of federal securities laws as well as ensuring that advisers have 
proper compliance controls in place.84  OCIE also examines exchanges, 
clearing agencies, and investment advisers that are affiliated with a broker-
dealer.85  OCIE conducts its on-site examinations with teams of 
“specialized staff,” but the Study does not go into further detail regarding 
the OCIE personnel.86  A limited examination is said to take a few days, 
while a more comprehensive examination might take several weeks or 
months to complete.87  The Study adds that comprehensive examinations 
of larger advisers with more complex operations as well as examinations 
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of higher-risk advisers often take longer and require more staffing.88  
Interestingly, the “comprehensive examinations” that take longer and 
require staff with “special expertise” are described in the Study as mutual 
fund complexes and hedge funds pursuing complex investment 
strategies.89  It does not seem plausible that OCIE has the necessary 
manpower and staff with the requisite “special expertise” to effectively 
examine and monitor the vast amounts of registered mutual funds and 
hedge funds.  OCIE’s only response regarding how it will examine 
complex operations is by stating that it will take longer and require specific 
staff members for areas requiring special expertise.  
 
B. Examination of Registration Investment Advisers Between October 
1, 2004 and September 30, 2010 
 
The Study explains that the number and frequency of examinations of 
registered investment advisers is a function of the number of registered 
investment advisers and the number of OCIE staff.90  During the six-year 
period between October 1, 2004 and September 30, 2010 the number of 
registered investment advisers increased and the number of OCIE staff 
dedicated to examining registered advisers decreased, which resulted in a 
decrease in the frequency of examinations.91  The Study reported that the 
number of registered advisers increased 38.5%, from 8,581 advisers to 
11,888 advisers and the assets managed by the registered advisers grew 
58.9%, from $24.1 trillion to $38.3 trillion.92  Accordingly, not only did 
the number of registered advisers increase and the number of OCIE staff 
dedicated to examining registered advisers decrease, but also the advisers’ 
assets under management increased by 9.1%.  Further, over the six-year 
period the number of OCIE staff decreased 3.6%, from 477 staff to 460 
staff and the Study adds that staff even fell as low as 425 staff between 
September 30, 2007 and September 30, 2008.93 
Following from the above statistics, the Study reported that the number 
of examinations decreased 29.8%, from 1,543 examinations in 2004 to 
1,083 examinations in 2010.94  This decrease in examinations performed 
by OCIE can be attributed to the increase in the number of registered 
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advisers, the decrease in OCIE staff, and the fact that OCIE devotes most 
of its resources to examinations of higher-risk advisers, which takes more 
time.95  These statistics indicate that the SEC and OCIE do not have the 
resources necessary to achieve their goal of improving compliance and 
monitoring risk.  Furthermore, the Study does not discuss anything 
regarding the adequacy of the examinations or whether or not the 
examinations are performed correctly and diligently by staff members who 
are able to understand the information they are gathering. 
 
C. Impact of the Act on Examination of Registered Investment Advisers 
 
The Study predicted that the number of SEC-registered advisers would 
grow from 8,358 advisers to 10,897 advisers in five years, and the amount 
of assets they manage would grow from $38.5 trillion to $49.5 trillion.96  
Later, in 2016 the OCIE reported in its “Examination Priorities For 2017” 
letter, that the OCIE oversees more than 12,000 investment advisers with 
nearly $67 trillion in assets under management.97  Also, in 2016 OCIE 
shifted 100 broker-dealer staff examiners to the Investment Adviser 
Examination program, which increased the total number of OCIE staff 
dedicated to examining only investment advisers to over 600 people.98  
However, simply increasing the number of staff members focusing on 
investment advisers is not enough.  OCIE needs investigators who 
understand the inner workings of private funds and how they operate.  
Overall, the lack of resources and specialization by the OCIE raises 
concern regarding the effectiveness of these examinations in monitoring 
risk. 
The SEC’s plan to increase investment adviser registration and its 
examination of these investment advisers through the OCIE is an 
ineffective regulatory approach and will ultimately be more harmful than 
helpful.  Hedge funds employ complex strategies in order to achieve 
absolute returns in all market environments and it is unlikely that the OCIE 
has the resources or expertise to comprehend these strategies disclosed by 
registered hedge funds.  The OCIE lacks the resources and expertise to 
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properly monitor investment advisers and the complex investment 
strategies the advisers’ hedge funds employ.  Former Federal Reserve 
Chairman, Alan Greenspan articulated this problem by stating, “[b]y the 
time of detection, hedge funds would have long since moved on to different 
strategies.”99 
This level of mandatory disclosure required of all registered investment 
advisers has harmful effects on the financial system.  Hedge funds are 
inherently secretive regarding their positions and strategies because they 
do not want competitors stealing their long-term trading strategies, which 
would hinder their competitive advantage.  This goal to maintain secrecy 
is in conflict with the disclosure requirements.  This level of disclosure is 
unnecessary compared to other aspects of the financial system where 
disclosure does not negate the purpose of the industry’s existence.   
The entire financial system benefits from the hedge fund industry for 
numerous reasons.  First, hedge funds are one of the main sources of 
creating liquidity in the market, which makes markets more efficient due 
to large capital injections.100  This increased liquidity in the markets leads 
to more financial options for investors and allows for new ways to hedge 
investments, which reduce overall risk.101  Second, hedge funds add value 
to the markets because of their potential influence over companies, which 
is necessary to invoke changes in management necessary to generate 
value.102  A number of hedge funds become activist shareholders acquiring 
a minority equity position in a corporation.103  Activist shareholders, such 
as hedge funds, advocate for changes within the corporation such as 
reducing costs, increasing leverage, or divesting certain businesses.104   
Finally, hedge funds contribute to global stability during a financial crisis 
by acting as a counterparty to systemically important financial systems.105  
Hedge funds assume risks that would otherwise have a negative impact on 
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the global financial system if not transferred from these large institutions’ 
balance sheets.106 
 
VIII. PROBLEM WITH THE CURRENT U.S. REGULATORY SCHEME 
 
The problem with the current hedge fund regulatory system set forth by 
PFIARA is that it does not prevent the spread of system risk or protect 
investors from illegal activity by hedge fund managers.  The relevant new 
rules introduced by PFIARA are the mandatory registration with the SEC 
of hedge fund managers with over $150 million of assets under 
management107 and the duty to disclose certain investment information to 
both the SEC and investors.  The goals of PFIARA are to further investor 
protection and reduce systemic risks created and accelerated by hedge fund 
activity.   
In order to promote investor protection, PFIARA requires that hedge 
fund advisers must now file Form ADV with the SEC.108 Form ADV is the 
official registration form an investment adviser must file with the SEC.  
The goal of Form ADV is to protect investors by creating risk profiles of 
investment advisers.109  PFIARA aims to satisfy its goal of better assessing 
systemic risk posed by hedge funds by requiring hedge funds to submit a 
Form PF to the SEC.110 Form PF contains data on each fund managed by 
a hedge fund manager and requires that the manager include his or her 
investment strategies, the percentage of the fund’s assets managed using 
high-frequency trading strategies, each fund’s gross and net assets, the 
value of its derivative positions, and its use of leverage amongst other 
things.111  The SEC does not have the expertise nor the resources to 
properly analyze this information and ultimately fails to reduce systemic 
risk posed by the hedge fund industry.   
However, the goals of PFIARA can be met without mandatory 
registration and thus, the SEC is not using its resources efficiently.  Hedge 
funds and their excessive use of leverage are often the main cause of 
systemic risk.  Requiring mandatory registration with the SEC results in 
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an increase of disclosed information regarding hedge fund activity.  The 
SEC still needs to bridge the gap between this new information by 
enforcing some standard relating to leverage.  Not only is there a 
disconnect between the influx of information regarding hedge fund activity 
and effective enforcement by the SEC, the information the SEC is 
receiving may not be accurate.  The SEC has stated that the data collected 
in Form PF is not consistent between investment advisers and could be 
misleading.112  The inconsistency arises because investment advisers take 
different approaches and assumptions made when disclosing the 
information required by the Form PF.113 Some of the complaints related to 
Form PF have been that the questions are ambiguous and that there has 
been little guidance by the SEC to clarify the manner in which the Form 
PF should be completed.114 Ultimately, the problem with Form PF and the 
SEC’s general information collecting ability is that there a lack of a 
uniform approach in providing the required information.  The SEC relies 
on the investment advisers to value their fund’s assets and derivate 
positions, which is difficult to do and requires some subjectivity.  
Finally, the increased disclosure requirements limit the effectiveness of 
hedge funds and therefore preclude the benefits hedge funds bring to 
financial markets.  Moreover, the increase in direct U.S. regulations 
inhibiting the hedge funds’ freedom will lead to hedge funds eventually 
moving abroad.115 If a mass exodus such as this occurs, investors will have 
no protection under the U.S. federal securities laws.   
 
IX. SOLUTION: INDIRECT REGULATION OF HEDGE FUNDS VIA SELF-
REGULATING PRIME BROKERS 
 
Indirect regulation is based on the regulation of the creditors and 
counterparties that provide financial services to hedge funds.116  In other 
words, the indirect regulation of hedge funds is done through the direct 
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regulation of other market participants such as creditors and counterparties 
of hedge funds. 
“Prime brokers” are the key counterparties to hedge funds and generally 
belong to a division of large investment banks.117  Prime brokers offer 
numerous services to hedge funds on a daily basis including: providing 
credit to finance funds’ leverage positions, providing margin credit to 
finance purchases of stock, borrowing stock from other hedge funds on 
behalf of hedge fund clients to support short positions, and as 
intermediaries in funds’ securities transactions.118 Prime brokers are in the 
best position to evaluate the fund’s risk exposure because they are able to 
determine the liquidity of the fund’s positions and the amount of leverage 
currently being employed by the fund.119 Regulating these prime brokers 
would ensure that they are properly monitoring a fund’s transactions and 
amount of leverage.  Otherwise, prime brokers are incentivized to ignore 
certain risk markers and look the other way if a hedge fund is engaging in 
risky behavior in order to maintain their prosperous business relationship 
with the hedge fund.  
A self-regulatory body of prime brokers would be able to implement an 
agreed upon method of risk management in order to deter prime brokers 
from offering favorable credit terms or offering low margin requirements 
in order to attract more hedge fund business.120  Further, an organization 
of prime brokers would be able to combine a particular hedge fund’s 
market positions, considering most hedge funds use multiple prime 
brokers.121  This also better addresses the PFIRA Act’s goal of preventing 
systemic risk because it puts the responsibility of monitoring leverage on 
the prime brokers who have the expertise and resources to do so.  These 
disclosures would help reduce systemic risk while also keeping hedge fund 
trading information and investment strategies confidential.122 A self-
regulating organization of prime brokers would have the necessary 
information on a particular hedge fund’s market positions and amount of 
leverage.  This body would be able to identify problems before they 
happen.123  If a self-regulatory organization of prime brokers consolidated 
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a particular hedge fund’s market positions and information regarding its 
use of leverage, any particular prime broker would have the necessary 
information to identify certain risks and avoid or limit extending credit to 
the fund.  
In order for this proposition to succeed, the self-regulating organization 
would need to be able to sanction and punish prime brokers who are not 
conducting proper risk management practices.  For example, a fine against 
a prime broker would need to be large enough so it exceeds the short-term 
benefit of a primer broker extending credit to an overleveraged hedge 
fund.124  Otherwise, there would be no deterrent if the wrongful action was 
still profitable.   
 
X. CONCLUSION 
 
The increased disclosure requirements set forth by PFIARA does not 
increase investor protection or reduce systemic risk posed by hedge funds.  
The use of excessive leverage by hedge funds is the main contributor to 
system risk and any regulatory regime should be focused around 
monitoring hedge funds’ use of leverage.  PFIARA changed the 
registration requirements of hedge fund advisers by mandating hedge 
funds with over $150 million of assets under management to register with 
the SEC under the Advisers Act.  However, the SEC does not have the 
expertise or available resources to analyze the disclosed information and 
use that information to protect investors and reduce systemic risk.  A 
potentially better regulatory strategy would be to regulate hedge funds 
indirectly by regulating the hedge funds’ prime brokers.  The creation of a 
self-regulating organization of prime brokers would help prevent systemic 
risk by requiring prime brokers to monitor the leverage and overall risk 
profiles of their hedge fund clients and refrain from extending credit if 
need be. 
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